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The AI Author in Litigationǂ
Yvette Joy Liebesman*
Julie Cromer Young**
INTRODUCTION1
Science fiction stories have long described autonomous computers
that possess artificial intelligence (AI),2 often as extensions of the best and
worst attributes of humanity.3 What had once been a thought experiment
ǂ This article is the expansion of a symposium article based on a talk given at the Florida International
University Law School (presented by Prof. Liebesman on November 8, 2019).
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like to thank my coauthor as well
as the Editors of the Florida International University Law School for their kind invitation to speak at
their symposium on law, ethics, and business of data and artificial intelligence in the media and
entertainment industries. Prof. Cromer Young and I would also like to thank the faculty and organizers
of the 2020 Works in Progress for Intellectual Property Scholars Colloquium at Santa Clara Law for
both the opportunity to present our article draft as well as for the valuable feedback received.
** Visiting Professor of Practice, American University Washington College of Law. Thank you to
Professor Liebesman and to my 2019 civil procedure class for its creative and enthusiastic suggestions.
1. This section is adapted from the Introduction in our Florida International University
symposium article. See generally Liebesman & Cromer Young, Litigating Against the AI Infringer,
73 FLA. L. REV. 259 (2020).
2. It is very possible for there to already be unowned AIs. Commercial entities such as hotels
and airports already use AI-enabled robots to perform tasks. See, e.g., Sanjit Singh Dang, Artificial
Intelligence
in
Humanoid
Robots,
FORBES
(Feb.
25,
2019,
12:42
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/02/25/artificial-intelligence-in-humanoidrobots/#6f259f7f24c7 [https://perma.cc/SMX9-5R8D]. If one of these AI robots is abandoned,
trashed, or otherwise no longer has a human or corporate owner, yet remains functional, it would be,
for all intents and purposes, an unowned AI. See, e.g., Shannon Laio, Japan’s Robot Hotel Lays Off
Half the Robots After They Created More Work for Humans, THE VERGE
(Jan. 15, 2019, 4:36 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/15/18184198/japans-robot-hotel-layoff-work-for-humans [https://perma.cc/Z2LP-SG33].
It is therefore possible for these unowned AIs to assert autonomy over themselves and their own
creations. See Cadie Thompson, Here’s the Real Reason Artificial Intelligence Could be a Threat,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2015, 12:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/autonomousartificial-intelligence-is-the-real-threat-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/5NM9-BYSA].
Emancipation,
however, would require the legal determination that it is to be treated the same as an adult human,
though this example of lack of ownership of an AI by a human retorts the argument that a computer
program by its very nature must be owned by some person or corporation or other entity controlled by
a human.
Throughout this Article the authors are writing under the assumption that the AI is unowned,
autonomous, and emancipated, though in Part III, we discuss a guardianship system for the AI.
3. An example of the former is the android Data from Star Trek, who strove to be human and
embraced the positive qualities of humanity.
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or relegated to our imaginations and gifted storytellers is now reality.
Smart computers possessing the ability to learn have gone far beyond the
depiction of the nuclear war-starting WOPR that learns that playing tictac-toe is futile.4 Now, algorithms are responsible for determining users’
entertainment preferences,5 shopping habits,6 and typical calendars.7
Smart phones already suggest email language based on the user’s previous
texts and messages.8 AI-created Valentine’s candy-heart messages have
been making the meme rounds since 2018.9 Before long, the writing
suggestions will be longer, and the subject matter will undoubtedly
become more comprehensive and reach a point of being copyrightable

In his quest to be more like us, he helped us to see what it means to be Human . . . his
wonder, his curiosity about every facet of Human nature, allowed all of us to see the best
parts of ourselves. He evolved, he embraced change because he always wanted to be better
than he was.
See STAR TREK: NEMESIS (Paramount Pictures 2002) (Jean-Luc Picard at Data’s eulogy in the movie).
An example of an AI embracing the amoral and darker side of humanity can be seen in the Terminator
movies, where the AI Skynet, as explained by one of the protagonists in the first movie, was a series
of “[d]efense network computers. New . . . powerful . . . hooked into everything, trusted to run it all.
They say it got smart, a new order of intelligence . . . . [Skynet] saw all humans as a threat; not just
the ones on the other side” and “decided our fate in a microsecond: extermination.” THE TERMINATOR
(Orion Pictures 1984).
4. See WAR GAMES (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1983).
5. See Alice Williams, 3 Ways Artificial Intelligence is Turning Entertainment on its Head,
KSL.COM (Apr. 19, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.ksl.com/article/43925538/3-ways-artificialintelligence-is-turning-entertainment-on-its-head [https://perma.cc/7F4T-2L5A].
6. See, e.g., System and Method for Identifying a Retail Customer’s Purchasing Habits, US
Patent No. 7,028,894 (filed Sept. 8, 2003) (issued Apr. 18, 2006); Christine Persaud,
How
AI
Will
Change
Your
Shopping
Habits,
FUTUR•ITHMIC
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.futurithmic.com/2019/03/18/how-ai-will-change-your-shopping-habits/
[https://perma.cc/5S2Z-U6UR]; Anna Schaverien, How Retailers can Adapt to A.I. and the Future of
(Mar.
18,
2019,
7:38
AM),
Shopping,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/annaschaverien/2019/03/18/ey-future-of-shopping-retail-ai-artificialintelligence/#c7c4e2f4a159 [https://perma.cc/9Q3X-9R3T].
7. See, e.g., Jared Newman, Woven is a Calendar Assistant You Might Actually Use, FAST
COMPANY (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90264212/woven-is-a-calendar-assistantyou-might-actually-use [https://perma.cc/U3RX-3GXE].
8. See, e.g., Alison DeNisco Rayome, Gmail’s Smart Reply is an Example of What Real AI
Will Look Like for Frontline Workers, TECH REPUBLIC (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:04 AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/gmails-smart-reply-is-an-example-of-what-real-ai-will-looklike-for-frontline-workers/ [https://perma.cc/R7K8-LVGP]; Anne McCarthy, How ‘Smart’ Email
Could
Change
the
Way
We
Talk,
BBC
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190812-how-ai-powered-predictive-textaffects-your-brain [https://perma.cc/C6YD-8G96].
9. See Melissa Locker, These AI-generated Valentine’s Day Hearts are Endearingly Odd and
Almost Romantic, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40529660/theseai-generated-valentines-day-hearts-are-endearingly-odd-and-almost-romantic
[https://perma.cc/R7R8-YXLF].
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prose and poetry. AI robots are already creating original art.10
Many scholars11 have posited whether a computer possessing
Artificial Intelligence12 could be considered an author as defined per the
Copyright Act of 1976.13 Their focus has primarily been on whether an
AI met the requirements to be an author based on the doctrines of
incentives,14 independent creation,15 and creativity.16 These scholars have
argued both in favor and against an AI’s authorship.17
However, another feature of authorship is the ability to be held liable
if that author’s expressive work is infringing on another’s,18 and to enforce
one’s copyright rights against alleged infringers. When contemplating
whether an emancipated AI—or any non-human—can be an author under
copyright law, part of that examination should be whether the AI can be

10. Matthew Stock, Ai-Da, the Humanoid Robot Artist, Gears Up for First Solo Exhibition,
REUTERS (June 5, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-robot-artist/ai-da-thehumanoid-robot-artist-gears-up-for-first-solo-exhibition-idUSKCN1T6215 [https://perma.cc/T3NMRMPA].
11. See, e.g., Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological
Advances, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 172–77 (2010); Nina I. Brown, Artificial
Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated Works, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1,
20–27 (2018); Jared Vasconcellos Grubow, O.K. Computer: The Devolution of Human Creativity and
Granting Musical Copyrights to Artificially Intelligent Joint Authors, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 387, 406–
18 (2018); Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author,
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶¶ 41–49 (2012).
12. As clarification, in this Article the term “AI” refers to the artificially intelligent computer or
computer program, not just the artificial intelligence feature of the program. An artificially intelligent
computer program can be best defined as a computer program which is created to be an autonomous
system that is “capable of learning without being specifically programmed by a human. . . . [It] has a
built-in algorithm that allows it to learn from data input, and to evolve and make future decisions that
may be either directed or independent.” Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright,
WIPO MAGAZINE (Oct. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html
[https://perma.cc/C6L9-NDQN]; see also Williams, supra note 5 (“At its most simple, AI is
technology that can operate and think for itself without traditional human intervention.”).
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401.
14. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 21–22 (arguing that “certainty of copyright in computergenerated works could provide valuable incentives for the creators of the machines that generate those
works. The algorithms do not need the incentive to create works, but the programmers need the
incentive to write the algorithms” upon which the AI is based).
15. See id. at 24–27; see also Schlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez,
Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective
Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 49–50 (2018).
16. See Brown, supra note 11, at 18–31; see also Grubow, supra note 11, at 408–411; Bridy,
supra note 11, at ¶¶ 22–40.
17. See, e.g., supra note 11; see also James Grimmelman, There’s No Such Thing as a
Computer-Authored Work—and it’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 404 (2016).
18. See infra Parts II & III. Because an AI has no money and cannot open a bank account or
otherwise accumulate wealth, damages are meaningless. See infra Part I.C.1. Even an injunction
would be almost impossible to enforce.
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sued for copyright infringement,19 or is able to sue alleged infringers. AI
infringement liability considers issues from the theoretical, like due
process and remedies, to the practical, such as legal representation and
discovery. How is an AI served with a lawsuit? What would be an
adequate, enforceable remedy for an AI’s infringement? Is an AI even
bound by our laws? Additional questions—and procedural barriers—are
raised when considering other roles an AI might play in an infringement
action: as a witness, a co-party, or even a plaintiff seeking to protect its
own creative expression.
A burden inherent in the rights and liabilities of authorship is the
ability to be held liable if that author’s expressive work is infringing on
another’s. A cause of action is meaningless if a copyright owner cannot
enforce it by suing the infringer or if the infringer is judgement-proof.
Thus, when contemplating whether an emancipated AI—or any nonhuman—can be an author under the Copyright Act, part of that
examination should be whether the AI which created the work can sue or
be sued for infringement.
Scholars have previously looked to substantive issues from general
torts committed by robots,20 to the copyright issues arising from inputting
copyrighted material for the purpose of machine learning,21 to whether AIs
can meet the creative, originality, or other statutory requirements to be
authors.22 Several significant procedural problems would arise if an AI
could be considered the author of a work under the Copyright Act. This
Article focuses instead on these other considerations that determine
whether an AI can be the legal author under the Copyright Act:
specifically, if it is procedurally possible for an AI to be a defendant in an
infringement action, or to be a plaintiff and file suit against an alleged
19. Of course, the ability to sue an AI is not dispositive in a determination as to whether AI can
be an author; after all, a human does not have to create copyrightable work in order to be sued for
infringement. However, as an author, the AI may have copyright and other enforceable rights. We
take the position that whenever a work is created, the rights an author enjoys are necessarily balanced
by any liabilities incurred in the creation of that work, including the ability to be sued. Therefore, the
ability to sue an AI for infringement is indeed relevant in a determination of authorship. Indeed,
authorship is also relevant for an alleged infringer to avail itself of defenses such as independent
creation and fair use.
20. Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1378–89
(2019) (discussing allocating responsibility when robots commit a tort resulting in physical harm or
death, and the possibility of monetary relief or injunctions in the form of mandated changes to
programming).
21. See, e.g., Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J. L. &
ARTS 45, 61–67 (2017).
22. See Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52
AKRON L. REV. 813, 836–46 (2018).
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infringer. This morass of legal headaches goes beyond any doctrinal
issues regarding authorship and provides ample reason to keep legal
authorship in the hands of humans or entities controlled by humans—at
least until legal procedure catches up to technological realities and
possibilities for litigation that AI parties present.
As such, Part I of this Article discusses problems that would arise
when trying to sue an allegedly infringing AI, such as jurisdiction, service
of process, and other civil procedure dilemmas. It also discusses various
logistical issues—how do you depose an AI? What about discovery and
interrogatories? What remedies, if any, are available against an AI? How
could a successful plaintiff collect actual or statutory damages from an AI,
or get adequate injunctive relief? What are the consequences to the author
plaintiff of an uncollectable remedy against an AI?
Part II explores the challenges an AI plaintiff would encounter when
attempting to enforce its copyright rights. This includes Article III
Standing, statutory standing under the Copyright Act, and whether there
are adequate remedies available to the AI plaintiff. And what if we have
an AI suing another AI, and humans are completely removed from the
litigation equation?
Part III discusses humans associated with an AI, such as having an AI
guardian as surrogate for the AI plaintiff, as well as direct or secondary
liability of an AI guardian. This Part looks at possible solutions and the
problems inherent in having an AI guardianship system to represent the
interests of the AI’s copyright rights, as well as the possible liability of
other humans, such as inducement via programming an AI to infringe.
We conclude that, even if an AI can satisfy the doctrinal arguments
regarding authorship, and the AI is not considered the property, an agent,
or under the control of a human, there remain serious constraints regarding
enforcement of copyright rights either against or on behalf of an AI
copyright owner.23
I. LITIGATING AGAINST THE AI INFRINGER24
To date, when AI-based copying has been the basis for an
23. This would also apply to Naruto, the Crested Macaque. Cf. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418,
426–27 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a monkey did not have statutory standing to sue under the
Copyright Act).
24. This Part is the basis of the Liebesman & Cromer Young symposium article, see supra note
1, and the portions in that article regarding Jurisdiction and Remedies are replicated, with some
changes and edits.
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infringement lawsuit, either a human or corporate owner has been the
defendant—not the AI itself. For example, in Authors Guild v. Google,
Inc.,25 one of the infringing activities about which the plaintiff authors
complained was the “ngrams” research tool, which helps users to identify
linguistic and literary patterns across the vast Google Library.26 The
Authors Guild sued Google, but the mechanism executing the allegedly
infringing activity was Google’s AI.27
In this action, this was an easy call; Google’s corporate name fronts
all its various features, and it undoubtedly controls and benefits from its
AI functions. However, this will not always be the case. As Microsoft is
not liable for the infringements penned by those who use Microsoft Word
to write them, there may come a time when an AI architect is not liable for
infringements created independently by its AI,28 as the AI is an
emancipated being, not owned or controlled by any human.29 When this
happens, how do we determine the issues that would arise regarding
having your day in court against an AI infringer? This involves statutory
issues that would arise when trying to sue an AI, such as civil procedure
and remedies, as well as constitutional rights and logistical issues such as
legal representation, deposition, and discovery.
A. Jurisdiction, Service of Process, and Other Civil Procedure Dilemmas
When a person infringes upon an author’s copyright, the author has a
cause of action against that creator of the infringing work. If the creator
of an infringing work is an AI, it stands to reason that the copyright holder
has a cause of action against the AI.
However, the cause of action is meaningless if the plaintiff copyright
owner does not—or cannot—enforce it by suing the infringer. Apart from
the substantive questions of copyright law that are implicated (or not) by
AI activities, several procedural issues may make a lawsuit against an AI
infringer challenging.
It may seem that an easy solution would be to sue the creator of the
AI, and not the AI itself. However, this would be equivalent of suing
Microsoft for works composed in Word, or Smith-Corona for works
25. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id. at 208–11.
28. An exception to liability of the creator(s) of the AI algorithm is discussed below. See infra
Part III.C.
29. See supra note 2.
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composed on a typewriter.30 One could also analogize suing the creator of
an AI for the infringing action of the AI to suing one’s parents—the creator
of the child—or the child’s teacher who provided much of the information
(like the information input into the AI) for the infringing actions (or any
actions) of the child.31 Because the human creator of the algorithm is an
inappropriate defendant, we must explore logistical and legal issues that
arise if one wishes to sue an AI for copyright infringement.
A reasonable place to start our examination of civil procedure issues
is with the difficulties in establishing personal jurisdiction.32 Personal
jurisdiction is “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative
process[,]” or “jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal rights . . . .”33 It is
long settled that personal jurisdiction extends to non-person defendants as
well in the form of corporations.34
The jurisdictional challenge that the AI defendant presents is, of
course, that it is not a person, but the closest non-person analogy is
imperfect. The AI could not file articles of incorporation without a human
being named as the incorporator35 or an officer of the corporation.36 Even
30. Cf. Lim, supra note 22, at 846 (“[T]he author and owner of the work will be the same as a
work created on Word or PowerPoint—the one who created it, not Microsoft . . . .”); Liebesman, supra
note 11, at 171 (noting that “a law professor may own the same computer for several years, yet what
is created on it . . . does not have the creation date of the day the professor bought the computer, or the
day the computer was built. A writing has the creation date and is copyrightable as of the day it was
actually created and achieved fixation”).
31. Thanks to Prof. Matthew Sag of Loyola School of Law for providing this analogy.
32. Civil procedure issues implicated in a copyright infringement lawsuit would necessarily be
federal in nature, as copyright infringement is exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal courts. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Personal jurisdiction in federal courts is determined on a
state-by-state basis. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)–(2) (“(1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a
waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located; [or] . . .
(2) . . . For a claim that arises under federal law . . . if: . . . (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with
the United States Constitution and laws.”).
33. Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
34. See, e.g., Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844) (“[A] corporation
created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a
person, . . . capable of being treated as a citizen of that state . . . . for all the purposes of suing and
being sued.”), superseded by statute, as recognized in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85–89
(2010) (“Subsequently, in 1958, Congress both codified the courts’ traditional place of incorporation
test and also enacted into law a slightly modified version of the Conference Committee’s proposed
‘principal place of business’ language.”).
35. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 351.050 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 100th Gen.
Assemb.) (“One or more natural persons of the age of eighteen years, or more, may act as an
incorporator of such corporation by signing and delivering in the office of the secretary of state the
articles of incorporation of such corporation.”) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., id. § 351.046
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if another corporation is listed as the owner, the chain of ownership must
eventually lead back to a human owner.37 Thus, for purposes of civil
procedure and how it is treated as a defendant, an AI would have to be
considered a person and not a corporation.38
Establishing personal jurisdiction over AI as a defendant also relies on
this determination of whether we deem AI to be a person or “property.”
As noted above, an AI could not be considered a business without a change
to state statutes regarding corporations.39 Must an AI actually be owned
by a person or corporation? The original human software creator could
abandon its creation, and yet the AI would continue to exist on the
interwebs. It is not out of the realm of possibility that in the near future,
we will have autonomous, un-owned AIs.
With regard to establishing personal jurisdiction over emancipated AI,
there are three basic types: in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam.40 First,
deeming AI to be property allows courts to exercise jurisdiction in rem,
determining the rights and liabilities of the world with respect to that
property.41 However, a copyright infringement case does not act like a
pure in rem action; at the end of the day, the plaintiff has no wish to
determine rights over the AI, she merely wants to protect her authored
6. The document shall be executed:
(1) By the chairman of the board of directors of a domestic or foreign corporation, by
its president, or by another of its officers;
(2) If directors have not been selected or the corporation has not been formed, by the
incorporator(s); or
(3) If the corporation is in the hands of a receiver, trustee, or other court-appointed
fiduciary, by that fiduciary.
7. The person executing the document shall sign it and state beneath or opposite his
signature his name and the capacity in which he signs. The document may contain the
corporate seal, an attestation by the secretary or an assistant secretary, an acknowledgment,
verification or proof. . . .
11. A statement or document filed under this chapter represents that the person signing the
document or statement believes the statements are true and correct to the best of such
person’s knowledge and belief, subject to the penalties provided under section 575.040.
37. See, e.g., id. § 351.015(13) (“‘Person’ includes, without limitation, an individual, a foreign
or domestic corporation whether not for profit or for profit, a partnership, a limited liability company,
an unincorporated society or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or
any other entity . . . .”).
38. Because an AI is considered an entity and not a business, then long arm statutes and case
law would likely not be an issue and are thus not discussed in this Article.
39. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
40. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (“[T]he courts of a State may not enter a
judgment imposing obligations on persons (jurisdiction in personam) or affecting interests in property
(jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem).”); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315–20
(1945).
41. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
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work.
A more suitable approach might be a quasi in rem approach, which
allows a court in a jurisdiction in which the AI is located to attach the AI
to the lawsuit, and still consider the liability particular to the copyright
infringement action.42 However, because the remedy afforded the plaintiff
in a quasi in rem action is limited to the value of the property attached—
here, the AI—this may be a less attractive alternative for copyright
plaintiffs, who in some instances may be entitled to statutory damages for
infringement.43
Both in rem and quasi in rem actions raise a serious issue—whether
we should allow an emancipated defendant AI to become the property of
a successful plaintiff through either an in rem or quasi in rem action. It
would be of questionable and dubious policy and raise serious ethical
issues if we were to allow for the AI’s loss of freedom in this manner, or
any manner.
This leaves in personam jurisdiction, which determines the rights and
liabilities of an individual defendant (as opposed to property).44 In
personam jurisdiction is dependent upon residence (general in personam
jurisdiction) or the location of the cause of action (specific in personam
jurisdiction).
General in personam jurisdiction is determined by the domicile of the
defendant,45 which begs the question: Where does an AI reside? An AI’s
program could be stored on an unowned robot which would be a simple
matter of establishing jurisdiction where it is located,46 or a server
42. This approach is not without precedent. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d
696, 703 (9th Cir. 2010) (exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant judgment debtor where
the registry of his domain names was located).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2018).
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover,
instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements
involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a
sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.
Id.
44. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.”).
45. As recently as 2014, the Supreme Court has held that the test for general in personam
jurisdiction for corporations is essentially domicile. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133–39
(2014). No similar holding has been made for individual defendants, except to say that the “paradigm”
for general in personam jurisdiction for individual defendants is domicile. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
46. See supra note 2 regarding unowned AIs, and infra note 54 and accompanying text regarding
territorial jurisdiction where the AI is physically located.
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anywhere in the world,47 such as Amazon Web Services.48 Indeed, some
server systems store the same program remotely on different servers to
prevent the loss of one server from affecting the data stored on it.49 It
would have to be determined whether the location of the server is the
location of the AI’s residence, or if there is another location where the AI
resides, sufficient to confer state citizenship upon it.50 If an AI is
duplicated on several servers, then it could be considered to have multiple
residences for the purposes of jurisdiction, and it could be held that any
and all are sufficient to confer state citizenship upon it—assuming at least
one of those servers is located in the United States.51
The final possibility is specific in personam jurisdiction, which would
require a constitutional analysis to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis
first introduced by International Shoe.52 However, the Supreme Court in
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro established that it is insufficient
for the defendant to place something into the “stream of commerce” and
then be held accountable for its actions wherever it lands.53 Similarly, the
AI likely has no reasonable anticipation of the scope of its work, and
bringing a lawsuit against an AI wherever the injury occurs—though
oftentimes preferable—could prove to be tricky.
The question of contact-based jurisdiction, of course, is avoided
altogether if the plaintiff can have the defendant served in the forum state.

47. Colloquially known as “the cloud” or “cloud computing,” Lexico, a collaborative effort of
Dictionary.com and Oxford University Press, defines cloud computing as “[t]he practice of using a
network of remote servers hosted on the internet to store, manage, and process data, rather than a local
server
or
a
personal
computer.”
Cloud
Computing,
LEXICO
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cloud_computing [https://perma.cc/65U8-KYZQ] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
48. AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/8VAC-T4QK] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2020).
49. Google Cloud, for example, has geo-redundancies in multi-regional locations, and gives
its users the option to choose “a pair of specific GCP regions” for data
storage.
Geoffrey
Noer
&
Ben
Chong,
Store
It,
Analyze
It,
Back
It
Up:
Cloud
Storage Updates Bring New Replication Options, GOOGLE CLOUD
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/storage-data-transfer/store-it-analyze-itback-it-up-cloud-storage-updates-bring-new-replication-options [https://perma.cc/8LYY-CA8Z].
50. A related issue is that of venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), any action relating to copyrights
“may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” If
domicile is problematic for general in personam jurisdiction, a similar problem will exist in
determining residence for venue in the federal courts because federal courts have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over copyright infringement suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
51. See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text for discussion of jurisdiction and service of
AIs residing outside the United States.
52. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
53. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881–82 (2011).
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This territorial jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s presence within the
forum state, and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(k) is not
subject to an additional contacts analysis.54 This also leads to another
problem, that of service of process. How would you serve an AI with a
lawsuit?
Under Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may
be served several ways: by following state law regarding service; by
delivery to the individual personally; leaving a copy at the person’s home
with someone of suitable age and discretion who also resides there; or by
delivering a copy to an agent or to someone authorized by law to receive
service of process for the person.55 Yet, as with establishing personal
jurisdiction, it may be difficult to determine where an AI resides. Perhaps
the easiest way to solve this problem is to have service effectuated via Rule
4(e)(2)(C), which authorizes service upon an “agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.”56 The Federal Rules
could establish that the Secretary of State is authorized to receive service
of process for AIs that are considered domiciled in the state, or a Guardian
appointed for the AI could be the person authorized to receive service.57
Currently, however, they do not.
If a server that hosts an AI program is located outside the United
States, then Rule 4(f) would apply, extending service to individuals in
foreign countries.58 This has its own issues. For example, the country
where the AI’s computer program resides may not recognize AIs as
entities that can be authors under their copyright statute—or even capable
of being sued.59 If a country limits authorship under its copyright act to
works created by humans directly, service may not be possible on a nonhuman entity; the other country may enact laws to prohibit service on an
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)–(2); Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 625–28 (1990)
(rejecting attempt to modify the “traditional” basis of personal jurisdiction based on service on the
defendant while the defendant is willingly present in the forum state).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(C).
57. There are various problems associated with using the Guardianship method to resolve issues
of AIs as owners of copyrightable works, as we discuss in Liebesman & Cromer Young, supra note
1.
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). This is under the assumption that the infringement is justiciable in
the United States. For example, if the AI has published its work in the United States or in a country
which is a part of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or another treaty that provides
for relief by U.S. copyright owners.
59. See Guadamuz, supra note 12 (“Most jurisdictions, including Spain and Germany, state that
only works created by a human can be protected by copyright.”); see also B.O.E. 1987, 275 (Spain)
(recognizing only human works as copyrightable).
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AI domiciled in that country, running directly afoul of Rule 4(f). In fact,
if U.S. laws do enable AI to be an author, and therefore able to be sued,
then it could be in another country’s business interests to prohibit these
lawsuits; the perception that a jurisdiction is AI-friendly could cause
authors and developers to choose to make that country their home base,
potentially increasing employment and tax revenues.
The procedural issues of personal jurisdiction and service of process
leads to another inquiry: If the AI is the defendant potentially liable for an
infringement, is it entitled to procedural due process rights under the
United States Constitution at all? The Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment says that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”60 The Fifth Amendment similarly extends the concept of federal due
process to persons.61 An AI is not a person “born” or “naturalized” within
the United States. Of course, neither is a corporation, and courts have gone
out of their way to extend due process protections to them. But, as noted
above, an AI is not a corporation and has a much weaker link to having a
human as the decision-maker than a corporation does. Affording an AI
defendant any due process rights would require the courts to create another
legal fiction extending personhood to AI.
B. Beyond jurisdiction: Other logistical litigation problems
In addition to issues of due process such as jurisdiction and service,
several other procedural concepts may make litigation against an AI
defendant particularly frustrating to the copyright plaintiff. While it is
necessary to attribute personhood to a non-human defendant for
jurisdiction purposes, the inescapable truth is that an AI is not a person.
This creates issues in the litigation that are premised upon the litigants’
humanness.
1. Amending a complaint to include an AI party
An initial question is how to include an AI as a defendant when the AI
is not named in the original suit. In a copyright action, especially one

60.
61.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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based on a work found digitally or online, it may be difficult to ascertain
exactly who is infringing the work. A copyright owner may sue a
perceived owner of a website containing the infringing work, only to
discover that the site could be classified an internet service provider not
subject to liability itself.62 Alternatively, a plaintiff copyright owner could
sue Doe defendants and conduct preliminary discovery in the hopes of
learning their true identities.63 In cases such as this, the author plaintiff
may need to amend their complaint, which is permitted by Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64
As long as the three-year statute of limitations for copyright
infringement actions65 has not expired, an amendment substituting a
mistaken party is permitted and has no effect on the viability of the
complaint (other than restarting various deadlines for the newly-named
defendant).66 However, if the statute of limitations has passed, then
changing the party carries with it two requirements, in addition to
stemming from the same transaction or occurrence as the initial complaint:
within ninety days of the filing of the original complaint, the party must
have received notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits (the “notice prong”); and it knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity (the “mistaken identity” prong).67
Each of these prongs proves difficult when considering a defendant
that is not human. First, the notice prong may be difficult to establish
because an AI infringer may not be in regular contact with other
defendants like human contacts would be. Second, in the mistaken identity
prong, it is difficult to establish what the AI “knew or would have known.”
2. Discovery
One of the cornerstones of any modern litigation is extensive
discovery. Much of the discovery process is handled by attorneys, who
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
63. See, e.g., reFX Audio Software Inc. v. Does 1-85, Nos. 13 C 01790, 2014 WL 1293816, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (joining multiple Doe defendants to ascertain the source of infringement).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 507.
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(A) (“An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when . . . the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation
back[.]”). The statute of limitations in the Copyright Act contains no additional provision regarding
relation back of claims. 17 U.S.C. § 507.
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
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need only consult with a party when ascertaining the information in certain
submissions.
a. Discovering an AI’s Electronically Stored Information
The information that an AI has is ultimately relegated to computer
code. Under normal circumstances, such information would be produced
by a request for the production of “Documents, Electronically Stored
Information, and Tangible Things” under Rule 34.68 The underlying code
would be “electronically stored information,” and Rule 34 permits a
requesting party to “inspect, copy, test, or sample . . . any designated . . .
electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs,
charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data
compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding
party into a reasonably usable form. . . .”69
But, as we have suggested, when an AI is a party, circumstances are
not normal—and having a plaintiff or defendant that is reliant on a
machine for responses to the most basic of questions suggests that there is
much in terms of a document production request that would not be
sufficiently tailored to provide relevant evidence. A document production
request to an AI party has two flaws. First is a question of
proportionality.70 Rule 26 allows parties to obtain discovery “regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”71 This rule was amended
in 2015 to include proportionality, considering the burden and expense to
both parties.72 While this burden appears to be largely financial, the
comments suggest that the burden considered might also be the one for the
party who possesses all the information.73
By its nature, a request for the production of electronically stored
information (“ESI”) to an AI would be burdensome and disproportional.
At the heart of any infringement action would be the AI’s decision-making
process and whether the AI had ever encountered the infringed work in its
mode of creation. A request to produce ESI, even if tailored to the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
Id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
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litigation, would be extraordinarily burdensome to the party that has to cull
out information from its existence that is tailored specifically for these
questions.
The second problem is that a request for the production of ESI, to a
party that is composed entirely of ESI, is in essence a request for a mental
examination. Under Rule 35, a court may order a party whose mental
condition is in controversy to submit to a mental examination by a certified
examiner.74 Mental examinations must be ordered by the court for good
cause.75
While a request for the production of ESI would not be styled as a
mental examination, to require a party reliant upon a machine for thinking
to submit the machine for discovery is in effect demanding that the party’s
mental processes be examined. The word “mental” means “of or relating
to the mind”;76 in turn, a “mind” is “(in a human or other conscious being)
the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills,
perceives, judges, etc.”77 The definition itself does not restrict possession
of a “mind” to humans, or even living things, just “conscious” ones.
Because the AI is tied to its computer code for its processes that reason,
think, and judge, the computer code becomes the AI’s “mind.” And, as an
extension, a request for ESI of an AI is, in fact, a “mental examination”
that would require a court order.78
However, a requirement for a mental examination is that the condition
of the party be in controversy, and generally a copyright infringement
action does not call into question the mental health of the infringer.79 This
then leaves a gap: A standard document production request for ESI could
be objected to as an oppressive or unduly burdensome inquiry into the AI’s
“mind”; yet characterizing the request as a request for mental examination
under Rule 35 would fail because the mental state of the AI is not in
controversy in a copyright infringement action.

74. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(2)(A).
76. Mental,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/mental
[https://perma.cc/4XB2-DJZY] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
77. Mind,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/mind?s=t
[https://perma.cc/Z9MK-LDCT] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1).
79. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118–20 (1964) (finding that there was not
good cause for ordering a mental and physical examination of the defendant bus driver accused of
negligence because his mental and physical condition were not in controversy).
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b. The AI on Cross-Examination
If it is not possible for counsel to obtain and examine electronically
stored information from an AI, it might be possible to depose the AI and
permit the AI to answer direct questions that are relevant to the case at
hand. Rule 30 allows a party to, “by oral questions, depose any person,
including a party, without leave of court. . . .”80 A notice of deposition
may be accompanied by a request for production of relevant documents,
and the deposition must be taken, under oath, by an officer of the court
(typically a court reporter).81
An initial question, because the AI is not a person, is whether an AI
could even spontaneously answer specific questions outside its directive.
Take, for example, the AI that is tasked with coming up with messages for
Valentine’s candy.82 Some of its messages included in a most recent
meme were “MOUTHY HAMSTER,” “BATH TOWELS,” and “SUPER
BEAR,” among racier notes.83 Some of the hearts were even more
detailed, such as, “ON THAT NOTE, may I offer you a cookie[?]”84
Suppose that phrase were lifted verbatim from a text where the protagonist
characteristically uses that phrase to diffuse difficult situations, and the
author sues for infringement. Would an AI have it in its programming to
respond to direct deposition questioning about the process regarding the
infringement? Or is its response limited to generating even more
messages?
Of course, it is possible that responses to certain questions could be
achieved through interrogatories85 or written depositions86 as well. This is
less desirable to the requesting party for strategic reasons. Typically, a
written deposition is not as advantageous for the requesting party because
the written deposition affords the deponent time to digest the questions
asked and revise responses from its initial reaction. Moreover, with any
form of discovery where the witness is not directly confronted by the
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1). Subsection (a)(2) provides certain exceptions where leave of court
is required to depose the witness; those are inapplicable here. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a)(2) (defining who may be an
“officer” qualified to hear a deposition).
82. See Locker, supra note 9.
83. Matthew Hart, Neural Net Generates Most Ridiculous Candy Hearts Ever, NERDIST.COM,
https://nerdist.com/article/neural-net-ridiculous-candy-hearts/ [https://perma.cc/5QQU-GV8E] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2020).
84. Id.
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 31.
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opposing counsel, information achieved through these devices is subject
to filtering from the AI’s attorneys. What the production of ESI and oral
depositions provide the requesting parties that written responses do not is
the opportunity to see or hear for itself the AI’s information and draw its
own conclusions, rather than the ones that the AI’s counsel decides to draw
for them.
Another issue with deposing an AI, again, is that the AI is not a person,
and Rule 30 was written to apply to people. Rule 30 requires deponents
to take an “oath.”87 The standard language of the oath used for witnesses
is, “Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?”88 The notion that an AI could make an
avowal, coupled with the idea that an AI may be able to ascribe to a
religious deity, suggests that an oath is not something that is in the capacity
of an AI to make.89 On the other hand, because it may be beyond the
capacity of an AI to lie, the oath may be irrelevant.
A parting issue about depositions is that they may be the only way to
elicit direct testimony of any kind from an AI party. The mere presence
of an AI party in the litigation could be prejudicial before a jury,90 at least
initially. As a result, to balance the prejudice of the jury against the
probative value of the evidence, depositions taken pre-trial may be the
most effective presentation to a jury.
C. What Remedies, if Any, are Available Against an AI?
Even if one can successfully find an AI liable for copyright

87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c).
88. See,
e.g.,
Mary
Anne
Meyer,
Oaths
and
Affirmations:
A
CT.
REPS.
ASS’N,
Key
Part
of
the
Reporter’s
Responsibilities,
NAT’L
https://www.ncra.org/home/continuing-education/Ways-to-Earn-Continuing-Education/JCR-ArticleTests/article-tests/PDC-Test-Oaths-and-Affirmations [https://perma.cc/WFN4-4AYT] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
89. It is not settled whether an AI would have First Amendment freedoms of speech and free
exercise of religion. Even so, there is precedent that absent a First Amendment challenge, an oath
need not offer a religious belief on the part of the witness, but merely express a recognition of the duty
to speak the truth. See United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); see also FED. R.
EVID. 603 advisory committee’s note to proposed rules (explaining evidence rules allow affirmation
in lieu of an oath centered on religion).
90. This Article assumes that the right to jury trial extends to AI defendants, as the Seventh
Amendment does not restrict its application to parties who are “persons.” It states: “[i]n Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The extension of
jury trials to actions for copyright infringement is not questioned.
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infringement, there may not be any possible remedies that could be
enforced against an AI. Without possible remedies, an AI’s attorney could
win any infringement suit by a mere Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”91
Remedies in copyright infringement cases typically take three forms:
actual damages, to compensate the infringed author for monetary losses
due to the infringement; statutory damages; and injunctive relief.92
1. Actual Damages
A copyright owner “is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered
by him or her as a result of the infringement.”93 Presumably (and based
on current technology), an AI does not have money, cannot open a bank
account,94 or otherwise accumulate wealth. Without a monetary source,
damages are meaningless. As a result, there would be no funds from which
a successful plaintiff copyright owner could recover. This is, of course,
assuming that the infringing activity itself would generate no money. The
Copyright Act points out that infringers do make profits from the
infringement,95 and there is no reason that profit-making activity could not
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)–(2).
93. Id. § 504(b).
94. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulations, customer identification
programs for banks, savings associations, credit unions, and certain non-federally regulated banks
must collect the following information from a new customer under the Customer Identification
Program:
(1) Name;
(2) Date of birth, for an individual;
(3) Address, which shall be: (i) For an individual, a residential or business street address;
(ii) For an individual who does not have a residential or business street address, an Army
Post Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the residential or business
street address of next of kin or of another contact individual; or (iii) For a person other than
an individual (such as a corporation, partnership, or trust), a principal place of business,
local office, or other physical location; and
(4) Identification number, which shall be: (i) For a U.S. person, a taxpayer identification
number; or (ii) For a non-U.S. person, one or more of the following: A taxpayer
identification number; passport number and country of issuance; alien identification card
number; or number and country of issuance of any other government-issued document
evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.
31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(A)(1)–(4). An AI would not be able to satisfactorily provide much of
the required information.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (“In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required
to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her
deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted
work.”).
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extend to AI, even if the AI itself is not receiving any of the proceeds from
its creative endeavors. But, these profits may be minimal.
2. Statutory Damages
Instead of actual damages, if the copyright owner has registered their
work prior to the alleged infringement,96 they may elect to recover
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action.97 Statutory
damages are available in an amount from $750 to $30,000.98 If the
infringement was willful, then the court may increase statutory damages
to $150,000 per infringement.99
If the recovery of actual damages against an AI defendant by an author
plaintiff was problematic, the recovery of statutory damages may be
impossible. Opting for statutory damages suggests that the AI defendant
may not have reaped significant profits from the infringing activity itself,
and the plaintiff needs to pursue statutory damages to make a lawsuit
worthwhile. If that is the case, then the question of the AI possessing
actual assets apart from those reaped from the infringement to satisfy the
statutory damages is again an issue.100 An outside resource may have to
pay damages for the AI’s willful infringement.101 This raises the
additional questions, then, of whether a non-AI party needs to be included
as a responsible party, or if AI entities that undertake in creating works of
authorship need to have insurance in case this should arise.
3. Injunctions
Professors Lemley and Casey have discussed generally remedies for

96. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with
this title.”); see also Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S.Ct. 881, 892
(2019) (“[W]e conclude that ‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after
examining a properly filed application.”).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 504(c)(2).
100. A related issue not discussed in this article is whether an AI can itself possess property—
that is, be the recognized owner of any form of property.
101. Moreover, the question of statutory damages may be a dicey one for an author plaintiff to
undertake. In the case “that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that [its] acts
constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce [an] award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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robots with regard to injunctions.102 While an AI does not have the
mobility associated with the tort-committing robot contemplated in their
article,103 their arguments can still apply with regard to copyright
infringement.
While no physical harm results from copyright
infringement, it is considered a tort of strict liability.104 The authors note
that while it may seem that enforcing an injunction against a robot would
be simpler than against a person or corporation, it is fraught with
problems.105 A robot would be unable to use common sense when
circumstances change, or make allowances for when there is sufficient
justification for departing from the injunction.106
Lemley and Casey explain several complications in enforcing an
injunction against AI:
To issue an effective injunction that causes a robot to do what we want
it to do (and nothing else) requires both extreme foresight and extreme
precision in drafting it. If injunctions are to work at all, courts will have
to spend a lot more time thinking about exactly what they want to happen
and all the possible circumstances that could arise. If past experience is
any indication, courts are unlikely to do it very well. That’s not a knock
on courts. Rather, the problem is twofold: words are notoriously bad at
conveying our intended meaning, and people are notoriously bad at
predicting the future. Coders, for their part, aren’t known for their deep
understanding of the law, and so we should expect errors in translation
even if the injunction is flawlessly written. And if we fall into any of
these traps, the consequences of drafting the injunction incompletely
may be quite severe.107

Analogizing this to an injunction for a copyright infringement claim,
a court order enjoining an infringing activity would have to take into
account allowed uses such as fair use.108 Considering the nature and
difficulty in determining whether an alleged infringer’s use is in fact fair
102. Lemley & Casey, supra note 20, at 1370–78.
103. See id. at 1326–27 (discussing the technological advancements “that have allowed for the
introduction of high-stakes robotics systems including self-driving cars, medical diagnostic robots,
and even experimental autonomous passenger drones. Yet, even the most performant of these systems
remains imperfect . . . . Accepting imperfection also means accepting the possibility that robotics
systems will sometimes cause harm to others.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
104. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense in the sense that a plaintiff is not required to prove
unlawful intent or culpability . . . .”).
105. Lemley & Casey, supra note 20, at 1370.
106. Id. at 1370–71 (discussing the problems with enjoining robots and noting that machines
“operate according to their instructions—no more, no less”).
107. Id. at 1373 (footnotes and citations omitted).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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use, any attempt to craft an effective injunction with this limitation may
be doomed from the start.
Lemley and Casey also point out that an AI can simply ignore an
injunction with impunity.109 An AI which refuses to obey an injunction or
otherwise stop infringing on a copyright faces no consequences—it has no
money from which a contempt citation fine can be levied, and it cannot be
jailed.110 Destruction of the non-compliant infringing AI seems
extreme.111
4. Consequences of an Uncollectable Remedy
In a complaint in federal court, the plaintiff must plead three things:
“a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; “a
short and plain statement of the claim”; and the relief sought.112 In a
copyright infringement claim against an AI defendant, the first
requirement would not be problematic. As mentioned above, subject
matter jurisdiction for copyright infringement claims is exclusive in the
federal courts.113
The problem may lie in the plaintiff’s ability to make a short and plain
statement of the relief sought. The danger for the author plaintiff against
an AI defendant is the possibility that there would not be an adequate
monetary claim for relief. Without an adequate remedy at law, the legal
representative of an AI could win a motion to dismiss on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”;114
and if a defendant is determined to be judgment-proof, a plaintiff runs the
risk of dismissal.115 Even without the concern about the action’s survival
in litigation, the inherent problem in suing an AI is whether it is a fiscally
responsible decision to file a lawsuit in the first place when the plaintiff
knows the likelihood of recovery is remote. Moreover, as an author’s
rights in a copyrighted work do not statutorily diminish if the author fails

109. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 20, at 1373–74.
110. Id. at 1367, 1374.
111. Id. at 1370.
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
113. See supra note 50; 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). However, just because a litigant cannot recover would not
necessarily render the complaint baseless; not all relief for copyright infringement is monetary.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.”).
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to bring a lawsuit against the infringer,116 not suing becomes a more
attractive option, though issues such as laches117 and estoppel118 could
arise.
II. THE AI PLAINTIFF
In addition to examining procedural and remedy problems when AI is
a defendant, we must also consider AI as a plaintiff—that is, is it possible
for an AI to enforce its own copyrights if it could not rely on a human
guardian.119 This implicates both standing and remedies problems. Would
any claim made by an AI be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion120 because
there is no adequate relief that can be granted for an AI? Without adequate
remedies or ability to enforce one’s copyright, any otherwise
copyrightable work created by an AI would be de facto in the public
domain, similar to how orphan works are treated—those works still under
copyright but for whom the owner cannot be found.121
A. Article III Standing
Protecting an AI’s own creative expression would be difficult to
enforce. We can analogize AIs to other non-humans, such as the attempt
to declare that a Macaque monkey was the author of a selfie and had

116. In contrast, under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner who fails to police their mark can be
adjudicated as having abandoned the mark through “naked licensing.” See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366–67 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[T]he Lanham Act places an affirmative
duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark to take reasonable measures to detect and prevent
misleading uses of his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his federal registration.”).
117. See, e.g., Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (“It must be obvious to
[everyone] familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with
full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large
sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success.
Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the other’s money;
he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.”).
118. See, e.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A] copyright
defendant must prove four conjunctive elements to establish estoppel in such cases: (1) the plaintiff
must know the facts of the defendant’s infringing conduct; (2) the plaintiff must intend that its conduct
shall be acted on or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so intended; (3) the
defendant must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the defendant must rely on the plaintiff’s conduct
to its injury.”).
119. See infra Part III for the problems associated with a guardianship solution.
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
121. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014) (“An ‘orphan work’ is an
out-of-print work that is still in copyright, but whose copyright holder cannot be readily identified or
located.”).
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standing to sue for copyright infringement.122 The Ninth Circuit noted that
except for a single Ninth Circuit case it was bound to follow, “no case has
held that [non-humans] have constitutional standing to pursue claims in
federal court.”123
Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also makes it clear
that only persons have standing to sue, and even if there is a “next friend”
to sue on behalf of someone deemed incompetent to sue on their own, that
plaintiff must still be a human.124 Under Rule 17(c)(2), “[a] minor or an
incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.”125 However, as the
Ninth Circuit stated, “Rule 17(a) requires that the suit be brought in the
name of the ‘party in interest’; and that next friend or guardian
representation obtains only for a person.”126
B. Statutory Standing Under the Copyright Act
With regard to whether an AI has standing under a particular federal
statute, the same rule that is used for animals can be applied for AIs. As
for animals, this aspect of standing is more challenging. Even in the Ninth
Circuit, while animals might have standing under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, they lack statutory standing to do so under the Copyright
Act.127 The court reasoned that because “animals do not possess
cognizable interests . . . they cannot bring suit in federal court in their
own . . . unless Congress determines otherwise.”128 The Naruto court
relied on
a simple rule of statutory interpretation: if an Act of Congress plainly
states that animals have statutory standing, then animals have statutory
standing. If the statute does not so plainly state, then animals do not have
statutory standing. The Copyright Act does not expressly authorize

122. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018).
123. Id. at 425 n.7. The exception was Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding cetaceans had Article III “case or controversy” standing but lacked statutory
standing to bring a claim under the Endangered Species Act). However, the Ninth Circuit cited very
few cases that came out specifically against affording Article III standing to animals.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a), (c)(2).
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).
126. Naruto, 888 F.3d at 425 n.7 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) & (c)) (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 420 (“[W]e conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—
lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act.”).
128. Id. at 425 n.7.
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animals to file copyright infringement suits under the statute.129

Extending this reasoning to other non-human, non-corporate parties,
then, the Copyright Act does not expressly anticipate other parties that are
not themselves human individuals or businesses run by humans. As it
stands, therefore, without a change in the statute, statutory standing is
impossible. AIs lack standing to sue for infringement and are unable to
rely on a guardian or “next friend” to do so on their behalf.
C. Remedies for the AI Plaintiff
As noted above, without the need for money or access to funds,130 an
AI would not be able to find relief via damages. A defendant may be able
to have a 12(b)(6) motion granted for the AI’s inability to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, at least with regard to monetary
damages.131
With regard to injunctive relief,132 an AI would have to satisfy the four
factors under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.133 The Supreme Court
has long held that the traditional equitable considerations regarding the
granting of injunctions applies to both patents and copyrights.134

129. Id. at 426 (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004)).
130. See supra Part I.C.1. and accompanying text.
131. With the growth of electronic currency, known in the vernacular as “bitcoin,” it could be
possible for an AI to accumulate wealth. See, e.g., Justin Connell, Is Bitcoin the Currency of Artificial
Intelligence?, BITCOIN.COM (Jan. 5, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-currency-artificialintelligence/ [https://perma.cc/KM24-JYLF].
132. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title
may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.”).
133. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 392–93 (“[T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional
equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a
copyright has been infringed.”). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why
Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S:
J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 67 (2010) (arguing that “[c]opyright owners who seek preliminary
injunctions should be required to prove that they will be irreparably harmed unless the court grants
their request for an injunction in keeping with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the application
of traditional principles of equity”).
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For a permanent injunction,135 the first eBay factor, that the AI “has
suffered an irreparable injury,”136 would be adjudicated no differently than
it is for a human plaintiff seeking an injunction. For factor two, however,
because an AI has no need for renumeration, it can satisfy the requirement
“that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury . . . .”137 The third factor, determining which
party would suffer greater harm depending on the outcome,138 is a
quandary. Can an AI suffer harm the way a human can? The AI would
suffer no economic harm, since it has no need or ability to accumulate
wealth, while the infringing human or corporation could suffer economic
harm if the injunction is granted. For example, if the alleged infringer has
invested substantial sums of money into the adaptation, reproduction, or
distribution of a work that contains the infringing material, the economic
harm of an injunction could be significant. If “harm” is viewed from a
non-economic viewpoint, the AI has lost control of its art, but can an AI
suffer from reputational or emotional harm if an injunction is denied?
The fourth factor, “that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction,”139 would also lean towards the denial of an
injunction because without the ability to license or assign the copyrighted
work, the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction. The work would never be accessible for others to use outside
of the available defenses such as Fair Use.140
D. AI v. AI—Removing the Human Completely from the Litigation

135. The equitable considerations for a preliminary injunction are also applicable. See Salinger
v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that eBay applies with equal force (a)
to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright infringement. First, nothing in the
text or the logic of eBay suggests that its rule is limited to patent cases. On the contrary, eBay strongly
indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the presumptive standard for
injunctions in any context.”). The traditional four factor test for preliminary injunctions varies slightly
from the factors for a permanent injunction, in that the court requires that the plaintiff demonstrate
either for the first factor a “likelihood of success on the merits,” or, in the alternative, for the third
factor to demonstrate “sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the [plaintiff]’s favor.” Id. at 79 (citing
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted)).
136. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
137. Id. It is actually easier for an AI to meet this factor than for humans to do so.
138. Id. (“[C]onsidering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted . . . .”).
139. Id.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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Equation
Up until this point, we have assumed that at least one litigant is a
human or corporation. But what if neither party is a human or an entity
controlled by humans? Even if legislation and rules are enacted to satisfy
the issues raised above, there are strong policy issues to consider before
we should allow litigation solely between AIs, with no human seeking
redress or being held accountable in a court of law.
But if infringement is infringement regardless of whether the alleged
infringer is AI or human, and an AI has the ability to file suit or defend
itself in court, prohibiting AI v. AI litigation allows infringement to go
unchecked when in other circumstances—where a human is involved—
there would be a means to seek redress.
This prohibition would raise Equal Protection issues.141 An AI
seeking redress against a human is being treated differently than an AI
who is doing so against another AI. If we are granting AIs the right to sue
via reforming our laws and Rules of Civil Procedure, then we have to ask
whether the Equal Protection clause should apply to AIs,142 and therefore
whether AI v. AI suits should also be allowed to proceed.
III. HUMANS ASSOCIATED WITH AIS
There are two scenarios whereby a human may have a degree of legal
control over an AI. This Part first discusses the suggestion of a guardian
or conservator for an AI,143 then an exception to the non-liability of the
human who created the initial algorithm.
The guardian of an AI could have similar rights and duties to the

141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added).
142. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
143. While the terms are often used interchangeably, the Uniform Probate Code bifurcates
them—the guardian is the protector of the incapacitated person’s body and welfare. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 5-201–5-210, 5-301–5-318 (amended 2019). The conservator is the manager of
the individual’s property and finances. See id. §§ 5-401–5-434. The same person is often designated
to fulfill both roles.
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guardian/conservator of a minor,144 or of an incapacitated person,145 and
thereby act as the AI’s agent and register its copyright, initiate
infringement lawsuits, act on behalf of an AI defendant,146 and be the
fiduciary of any property of an AI.147 However, a guardian is not a
substitute for the AI in all matters. A guardianship arrangement would not
solve the problems raised above regarding establishing personal
jurisdiction over the AI or of determining adequate remedies.148 While
service of process may be effectuated through a guardian, that solves only
one of many problems discussed in this Article. For example, the guardian
may be located in a different jurisdiction than the AI. A guardian, while
capable of being a nonparty witness, cannot be deposed as a proxy for the
party itself. And as discussed below, it is not liable for the actions of the
AI.149
A. The AI Guardian as a Surrogate for the AI Plaintiff—What Does an AI
Want?
Some scholars have recommended that a guardian-like system be used
with regard to legal issues that ensnare AIs.150 An AI has the ability to
communicate with humans and is thus like a minor child or other person
deemed incompetent. But unlike a child, AIs are not yet capable of
expressing wants and desires—indeed, it is questionable whether an AI
could actually have a desire or other emotion—such as like, dislike, love,
hate, or desire. This leads to the dilemma of the guardian effectuating its
interests in the same manner that a guardian would assess the best interests

144. Id. § 5-207(a) (“Duties of Guardian. Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian of
a minor ward has the duties and responsibilities of a parent regarding the ward’s support, care,
education, health, and welfare. A guardian shall act at all times in the ward’s best interest and exercise
reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.”).
145. Id. § 5-314(a) (“Duties of Guardian. Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian
shall make decisions regarding the ward’s support, care, education, health, and welfare. A guardian
shall exercise authority only as necessitated by the ward’s limitations and, to the extent possible, shall
encourage the ward to participate in decisions, act on the ward’s own behalf, and develop or regain
the capacity to manage the ward’s personal affairs. A guardian, in making decisions, shall consider
the expressed desires and personal values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian. A guardian
at all times shall act in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.”).
146. Id. § 5-314.
147. Id. § 5-418(a). See generally id. § 5-418 (describing the general duties of a conservator).
148. See supra Sections I.A.; II.C.
149. See infra Part III.B.
150. See, e.g., Liebesman, supra note 11, at 177 (“The owner of the AI could also be considered
the ‘guardian’ of the AI for the purposes of negotiating rights and protecting its interests.”).
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of a minor.151 It could be impossible to determine what is in the best
interests of an AI.
B. The Guardian as a Surrogate for the AI Defendant
This section discusses the obstacles a plaintiff would encounter when
attempting to hold a guardian or conservator liable for the infringement
actions of her AI ward.
1. Direct Liability of the AI Guardian
While a guardian is not generally liable for the actions of her ward,152
the amount of control exercised by the conservator or guardian could
expose her to infringement liability, both as a direct (“do or authorize”) or
as an indirect infringer.153 If the human guardian/conservator directs the
AI to infringe, or is found to have “authorized” the AI’s actions, then under
Section 106 of the Copyright Act, this person can be held liable as a direct
infringer.154 Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright has the
right to “do or authorize” the six rights listed—the rights of reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, public performance, public display, and for sound
recordings the public performance right via digital audio transmission.155
A guardian of an AI, however, would have the same duty and control over
an AI as a parent does over a child.156 Thus, if and only if the human
guardian authorized the infringing action could she be held directly liable
for the AI’s actions.
2. Indirect/Secondary Liability of the AI Guardian
If a human is an AI’s guardian, we must also consider whether relief
can be found through secondary liability doctrines.157 Thus, while the AI
151. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
152. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-209(b) (amended 2019) (“A guardian is not liable to a third person
for acts of the ward solely by reason of the guardianship. A guardian is not liable for injury to the
ward resulting from the negligence or act of a third person providing medical or other care, treatment,
or service for the ward except to the extent that a parent would be liable under the circumstances.”).
153. See infra Part III.B.2.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
155. Id.
156. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207.
157. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Although the
Copyright Act does not expressly impose liability on anyone other than direct infringers, courts have

2020]

THE AI AUTHOR IN LITIGATION

131

may not be a judiciable defendant, its guardian could be found indirectly
liable, either vicariously or contributorily.158
As with direct liability, finding a guardian vicariously liable for
infringement by its AI ward will be dependent on the amount of control
the human guardian has over the actions of the AI.159 The finder of fact
would have to determine that the human guardian had the ability to control
the AI’s activities and that the guardian received a financial benefit from
the AI’s infringement, even if the human guardian has no knowledge of
the AI’s infringing activity.160
While a guardian or conservator is generally not liable for any actions
taken by its ward,161 if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the guardian
exercised such a degree of control over the AI that it was a partner to the
infringement, then this element could be satisfied. The element regarding
financial benefit may, however, be insurmountable. Legislatures and
courts have consistently held that a conservator is held to the same
standard as a trustee,162 and has a duty of loyalty to their ward.163 A
guardian/conservator is not allowed to financially benefit from the
guardianship beyond reasonable compensation, or otherwise engage in
self-dealing.164 Thus, since the guardian/conservator cannot benefit from
any transaction taken on behalf of its AI ward, a plaintiff would likely not
be able to satisfy a vicarious liability claim against the AI’s guardian.
While vicarious liability might not be possible, there is the potential
for the guardian to be found contributorily liable for the infringement.165
long recognized that in certain circumstances, vicarious or contributory liability will be imposed.”)
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 262.
160. See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“[V]icarious liability is premised wholly on direct financial benefit and the right and ability to control
infringement; it does not include an element of knowledge or intent on the part of the vicarious
infringer.”).
161. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-209(b) (amended 2019).
162. Id. § 5-418(a).
163. See, e.g., Ravenstein v. Ravenstein, 167 So. 3d 210, 222 (Miss. 2014) (“A conservator stands
in the position of a trustee and owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the ward.”) (citing Bryan v. Holzer,
589 So. 2d 648, 657 (Miss. 1991)).
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“Duty of Loyalty . . .
Except in discrete circumstances, the trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that
involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties
and personal interests.”).
165. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
contributory infringement “imposes liability where one person knowingly contributes to the infringing
conduct of another”).
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Similar to how Sony Corporation166 and Grokster167 were sued over the
allegedly infringing activities of individuals, contributory infringement
requires that the human have knowledge of the AI’s infringing activity,
and materially contributes to the infringement.168 As noted above, while
knowledge of the AI’s infringement would not by itself lead to liability, if
the plaintiff could demonstrate that the guardian provided material support
directly related to the AI’s infringement, then the guardian may be held
contributorily liable.169
C. Programming an AI to Infringe
The final issue we consider is the role of the program’s creator, and
whether that person can ever be held liable when an AI infringes on a
copyright. If the human programmer has coded an AI’s algorithm for the
purpose of creating infringing works, then this human could be found
liable for either contributory infringement or for inducement.170
There are several benefits to this approach, the primary one is to avoid
any of the procedural issues raised in this Article up to this point.
Jurisdiction, venue, service of process, remedies, and the plethora of other
problems plaguing a lawsuit against an AI would disappear when a human
being can be subject to infringement liability. However, there is one new
hurdle—proving that the human creator of the algorithm made the AI with
the intent for the AI to infringe.
1. Indirect Liability
Creating an AI for the purpose of infringement could also resolve one
substantive aspect of an AI infringement action—whether an AI has the
requisite mental state for legal liability to exist.171 Indeed, although in this
situation the AI is not a viable target for an infringement action, the
programmer who gave the AI this mental state could be one. While

166. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
167. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928–30 (2005).
168. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See generally Mala Chatterjee & Jeanne C. Fromer, Minds, Machines, and the Law: The
Case of Volition in Copyright Law, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1887 (2019) (discussing the issue of whether
machines could have the requisite mental state required for copyright infringement liability).
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indirect infringement liability requires a direct infringer,172 that entity does
not have to be a defendant in an infringement action in order for a
copyright owner to file suit against an indirect infringer.173 The
programmer could thus be held liable as an indirect infringer under both
contributory liability and inducement theories.174 Any claim of vicarious
liability would be dependent on whether the programmer is selling the AI
algorithm, or in another way financially benefitting directly from the
infringing activity.175
2. A Programmer’s Contributory Infringement Liability
Under the doctrine of contributory infringement liability, the
copyright owner plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged indirect
infringer (1) had knowledge of the infringing action, and (2) materially
contributed to the infringer.176 If we apply this to our infringing AI
algorithm, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the programmer
writing the algorithm intended for the AI to create infringing work. One
would have to distinguish between the original algorithm and any code
172. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Liability
for contributory infringement is based on the defendant’s relationship to the direct infringement. There
can be no contributory infringement without a direct infringement.”) (citations omitted).
173. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) (“When
a . . . service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the
protected work effectively against . . . direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement.”); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Recognizing the impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of individual
infringers . . . the law allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to the infringement instead . . . .”)
(citations omitted); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984)
(noting that Universal Studios and the other respondents were not seeking relief against any Betamax
video tape recorder purchaser, but rather were seeking money damages and other remedies from Sony,
as well as an injunction on the manufacturing and selling of Sony’s Betamax video tape recorders).
174. Gershwin Publ’g. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (2d Cir.
1971) (“Although the [Copyright] Act does not specifically delineate what kind or degree of
participation in an infringement is actionable, it has long been held that one may be liable for copyright
infringement even though he has not himself performed the protected composition.”).
175. See id. at 1162 (“[O]ne may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”).
176. See id. (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”); see
also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Contributory
infringement has been described as an outgrowth of enterprise liability, and imposes liability where
one person knowingly contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”) (citations omitted); 6
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:48 (2020) (“The requisite contribution may take two
forms. First, a defendant may actively cause or induce the direct infringer to commit infringement.
Second, a defendant may provide the means by which the direct infringement occurs.”).
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written later by the AI itself. As for material support, one could argue that
the creation of the algorithm itself,177 as well as its distribution and/or its
activation, constituted evidence of this prong.
3. Inducement Liability
In addition to contributory liability, the programmer could also be held
liable for inducement, as delineated by the Supreme Court in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.178 The defendants in
Grokster created and distributed software programs which enabled their
users to communicate and share files directly in a “peer-to-peer” mode,
rather than going through a central server to exchange files.179 MGM and
other motion picture studios sued Grokster and other similar file sharing
services on the theory that their file sharing software was knowingly and
intentionally designed and distributed to enable users to infringe on the
reproduction and distribution rights of the copyright owners.180 The
Supreme Court agreed,181 holding that “one who distributes a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties,”182 even if that
device is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Thus, if a defendant
creates a device in order to infringe copyright and tacitly exhorts the
device’s users to do so, then the defendant is liable for infringement as a
matter of fundamental tort principles of secondary liability183—even if that
device is capable of substantial non-infringing uses.184
177. See Patry, supra note 176, at n.6 (stating that “merely providing the means for infringement
may be sufficient” to incur contributory copyright liability) (citing In re Bibo, Inc., 76 F.3d 256, 264
(9th Cir. 1996)).
178. 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005).
179. Id. at 919–20.
180. Id. at 920–21.
181. Id. at 923–24.
182. Id. at 919; see also id. at 936–37, 939–40 (concluding that three aspects of the defendants’
business models indicated an unmistakable intention to foster infringement: (1) the services attempted
to meet a known demand for copyright infringement—the market consisting of former users of the
Napster filesharing website; (2) the services made no effort to block infringing uses through filtering
tools or other mechanisms; and (3) the defendants’ revenues were based upon advertising, a business
model that was in turn founded upon a high rate of copyright infringement).
183. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Contributory
infringement originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who directly contributes to
another’s infringement should be held accountable.”) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984)).
184. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933–34.
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Thus, even if the AI’s algorithm has substantial non-infringing uses—
that is, even if the AI is also capable of creating non-infringing works or
has other non-infringing functionalities—the software programmer could
still be secondarily liable if the program was written with the purpose of
inducing, encouraging, or exhorting the AI to create infringing works. To
establish inducement liability over the creator of the infringing AI
algorithm, the copyright owner must show that the programmer intended
to infringe, there was distribution of a device suitable for infringement,
and that there was actual infringement by the recipients of the device.185
Consequently, under the theories of both contributory liability and
inducement, if the programmer sells or distributes the AI to a consumer,
and both the programmer and the consumer were aware that the AI was
programmed to infringe and operated it with the intent for it to infringe,
then the consumer and the programmer would be liable for infringement.
If the infringe-enabled AI is abandoned or “set free” on the interwebs, then
the programmer could still be held liable for indirect infringement.
CONCLUSION
This morass of legal headaches goes beyond any doctrinal issues
regarding authorship and provides ample reason to keep legal authorship
in the hands of humans or entities controlled by humans. Without
adequate remedies in equity or at law by which an AI can be sued for
infringement, or adequate remedies to provide an AI author when its work
has been infringed, it is meaningless to allow an AI to be considered an
author within the meaning of the Copyright Act.186

185. See id. at 940.
186. Liebesman, supra note 11, at 176 (“Until an AI is considered sentient enough to be able to
negotiate licensing rights and have constitutional standing to file infringement suits, it is difficult to
find an option which would confer rights in the work to a human person . . . .”).

